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WELFARE
LAW,
WELFARE
FRAUD, AND THE MORAL
REGULATION OF THE ‘NEVER
DESERVING’ POOR
DOROTHY E. CHUNN AND SHELLEY A. M. GAVIGAN
Simon Fraser University, Canada, and Osgoode Hall Law School, Canada

ABSTRACT
The dismantling and restructuring of Keynesian social security programmes have
impacted disproportionately on women, especially lone parent mothers, and shifted public
discourse and social images from welfare fraud to welfare as fraud, thereby linking
poverty, welfare and crime. This article analyzes the current, inordinate focus on ‘welfare
cheats’. The criminalization of poverty raises theoretical and empirical questions related
to regulation, control, and the relationship between them at particular historical moments.
Moral regulation scholars working within post-structuralist and post-modern frameworks
have developed an influential approach to these issues; however, we situate ourselves in a
different stream of critical socio-legal studies that takes as its point of departure the efficacy,
contradictions and inherently social nature of law in a given social formation. With
reference to the historical treatment of poor women on welfare, we develop three themes
in our critical review of the moral regulation concept: the conceptualization of welfare
and welfare law, as illustrated by welfare fraud; the relationship between social and
moral with respect to the role of law; and changing forms of the relationship between state
and non-state institutions and agencies. We conclude with comments on the utility of a
‘materialist’ concept of moral regulation for feminist theorizing.

INTRODUCTION

The continuing offensive against welfare provides, perhaps, the single most
general threat to Western women’s interests at present – at least for those many
women who are not wealthy, and who still take the major responsibility for
caring work in the home. (Segal, 1999: 206–7)

. . . the statistics unequivocally demonstrate that both women and single
mothers are disproportionately adversely affected by the definition of spouse
. . . although women accounted for only 54% of those receiving social assistance

and only 60% of single persons receiving social assistance, they accounted for nearly
90% whose benefits were terminated by the [new] definition of spouse . . .
(Falkiner v Ontario [2002]: 504, para. 77)

The attacks on the policies and practices of the Keynesian welfare state have
resulted in wholesale dismantling

and restructuring

of social security

programmes for the poor. These sweeping changes to social assistance, aptly
characterized by some as a war on the poor, have a disproportionate impact on
poor women, as even Canadian courts have begun to acknowledge (Falkiner
v Ontario, 2002). Indeed, it has become axiomatic to observe, as Lynne Segal
does above in relation to welfare, that welfare law is principally (and
ideologically) concerned with the lives and issues of poor women, especially
lone parent mothers.
In this article, we will identify and analyze the pride of place the focus on
‘welfare cheats’ occupies in the current attack on the poor. It is important to
emphasize that this preoccupation with welfare ‘fraud’ is but the most visible form
of assault. The attack on welfare in the province of Ontario over the last
decade, for instance, included deep cuts to the level of welfare benefits (Masse v
Ontario, [1996]; see also Moscovitch, 1997: 85), a broadening definition of
‘spouse’ (Falkiner v Ontario, 2002), restructuring of the legislation from ‘welfare’
to ‘work’,1 mandatory drug testing,2 the introduction of a ‘quit/fire’ regulation
(which requires the cancellation or suspension of assistance to a recipient who
resigns employment without just cause or is dismissed with cause),3
anonymous snitch lines, designed to encourage people to report suspected
welfare abuse by their neighbours (Morrison and Pearce, 1995; Morrison, 1998:
32), and ‘zero tolerance’ in the form of permanent ineligibility imposed upon

anyone convicted of welfare fraud (Golding and Middleton, 1982; Evans and
Swift, 2000; Rogers v Sudbury (2001: 5); Broomer v Ontario [2002]). In this
process, the restructuring of welfare has shifted and been shifted by public
discourse and social images (see Golding and Middleton, 1982; Evans and Swift,
2000): welfare fraud became welfare as fraud. Thus poverty, welfare and crime
were linked.4 To be poor was to be culpable, or at least vulnerable to culpability.
Two Ontario women convicted of welfare fraud offer case studies of the
culpable poor in this new era. Kimberly Rogers pleaded guilty to welfare fraud
in the spring of 2001. Her fraud involved receiving a student loan and welfare
assistance at the same time (previously but no longer permitted by Ontario’s
legislation).5 In light of the fact that she was pregnant, and had no prior criminal
record, the judge sentenced her to a six month period of house arrest. However, as
a result of the ‘zero tolerance’ policy celebrated by the Ontario government,
which then stipulated three months, and later, permanent ineligibility of people
convicted of welfare fraud, Ms Rogers had no source of income (MacKinnon
and Lacey, 2001; Keck, 2002). Confined to her small apartment by virtue of the
‘house arrest’ condition of her sentence for welfare fraud, it took a court order
directing that she receive interim assistance pending the hearing of her challenge
to the constitutionality of the new ineligibility rules (Rogers v Sudbury (2001)).
Even when her assistance ($468 per month) was reinstated on an interim basis,
her rent ($450 per month) consumed the bulk of her monthly cheque. As a
friend later observed: ‘No one can stretch $18 for a whole month’
(MacKinnon and Lacey, 2001). Isolated, in her eighth month of pregnancy, with
an uncertain future at best, and unable to leave her apartment, Ms Rogers died
of a prescription drug overdose during a sweltering heat wave in mid-August

2001. The circumstances of Ms Rogers’s death gave rise to a coroner’s inquest in the
fall of 2002. The coroner’s jury made 14 recommendations for changes in
government policies and practices, directed to no less than five provincial
ministries; the first of which was that the zero tolerance lifetime ineligibility for
social assistance as a result of welfare fraud be eliminated (Ontario, 2002).6
In 1994, Donna Bond, a single mother of two teenage children, had been
charged with ‘welfare fraud’ to the amount of $16,477.84 over a 16-month
period – a bank account that had not been disclosed in her annual Update
Report. At her trial, Ms Bond testified that she had saved all the money she had
ever received from part-time employment, baby bonus, child tax credits, and
income tax refunds (all of which she had disclosed in her annual reports to
welfare). While she had initially planned to buy a car with this money, the serious
health problems of her children made her realize that they ‘will require
financial assistance to deal with these problems in the years ahead’ (R. v Bond
[1994]: para. 8). She decided to set the money aside as a trust fund for the children.
When the account was discovered (easily it seems), she said that she had ‘honestly
believed that she did not have to report the savings because they were for the
children’ (para. 13).
The trial judge admitted to a dilemma:

. . . I was very impressed by the sincerity and achievement of the accused and
troubled by the paradox of criminalizing the actions of this woman who
scrimped as a hedge against the future financial health needs of her children. If she
had spent this money on drinking, or drugs, or in any other irresponsible way, there
would be no basis for any criminal charge. A conviction seems to send the
message it was wrong to be conscientious about the welfare of her children and

foolish to be frugal. (para. 14)

Troubled as he was, convict he did, neither the first nor last ‘sympathetic’ judge
to enter a conviction for fraud against a welfare mother (Martin, 1992; Carruthers,
1995). While critics might regard this case as affording an instance in which
reasonable doubt as to guilt ought to have existed, the trial judge took a different
view of her culpability: ‘[H]er commendable frugality and her selfless motives for
committing the offence are matters for consideration on sentencing’ (R. v Bond
[1994]: para. 14). Were this normatively perfect mother not convicted of
welfare fraud, she might well have been recognized by a community
organization, or a women’s magazine, as ‘Mother and Homemaker of the
Year’.

In our view, the Bond and Rogers cases raise many theoretical and empirical
questions related to regulation, law, morality and the relationship between them at
particular historical moments. We rely on their cases to develop three themes in
this article:

• the conceptualization of welfare and welfare law as illustrated by welfare fraud;
• the relationship between social and moral with respect to the role of law;
• changing forms (and continued relevance) of the state and its relationship with
non-state institutions and agencies.

An increasingly prominent approach to these issues in critical socio-legal
studies through the 1980s and 1990s was evident in the proliferating literature on

the arguably related concepts of ‘moral regulation’, ‘risk’, ‘governance’, and
‘governmentality’ generated by scholars working within post-structuralist and
post-modern frameworks. We focus here primarily on moral regulation in the
Canadian context. While the concept of moral regulation initially was developed
by Marxist-influenced theorists (Hall, 1980; Corrigan and Sayer, 1981; 1985), a
number of Canadian scholars have employed a (re)formed concept in their
work which illustrates the decentring trend in theories of regulation and control
(Valverde and Weir, 1988: 31–4; Valverde, 1991, 1998; Loo, 1992: 125–65; Strange
and Loo, 1997; Little, 1998) that also characterizes contemporary theorizing
about governance and governmentality (Dean, 1994, 1999; Stenson, 1999). The
moral regulation literature in Canada is not confined within a particular
discipline, but it does tend to be connected to interdisciplinary work that often
has an historical focus (see Hunt, 1997, 1999; Strange and Loo, 1997; Campbell,
1999).
The strength of this scholarship is the light it sheds on non-state forces and
discourses, as well as the important insight that the state does not hold a
monopoly on ‘social’ and ‘moral’ initiatives. The criticism of blunt,
overinclusive notions of ‘law and state as social control’ and of the excesses of
economic determinism is also well taken. However, we also find echoes of the
sociological, criminological, and (some) feminist literature on ‘social control’
in this work on moral regulation. Indeed, it seems to us that contemporary writers
have used the concept of moral regulation to analyze many of the same issues
that were of concern to social control scholars a century earlier (Chunn and
Gavigan, 1988: 107–28): the relationship between state and civil society, public
and private, formal and informal control, and the construction, control or

regulation of ‘moralized’ subjects, objects and projects (see Hunt, 1997: 275–
301; 1999). Thus, while we share many of the same concerns as moral regulation
scholars and have some sympathy for their projects and arguments, we nonetheless
want to argue for a more fully social and materialized form of the concept of moral
regulation. In short, we want to rematerialize the moral by situating moral
regulation in relation to particular forms of social formation and within specific
forms of state, law and social policy (Stenson and Watt, 1999; Clarke, 2000).
Rather than jettison the concepts of ‘social’ or ‘control’, we want to argue that
‘moral regulation’ need not be considered as an alternative or necessarily superior
concept and that, therefore, sites and forms of regulation and control require
different, not alternative, forms of analysis. So, while we agree that recourse to
the language of ‘control’ or ‘social control’ too often obscures the complex and
contradictory sources, contexts and objects encompassed, we are of the view that
regulation neither supplants nor captures the field. Not every state action or law is
an expression of ‘social control’ – but nor is it necessarily a form of regulation,
moral or otherwise. To assume that moral regulation is inevitably more flexible
or precise than social control is to replicate the theoretical error of over-inclusivity.
Thus, despite the significance of nonstate actors and processes, it remains
important to identify the links, forms and sites of state action and inaction. We
want to distance our notion of moral regulation from one which suggests that the
state is disappearing or ceasing to be relevant. In our view, the state never ceases
to be a player, even when benched, ignored by some, or out-manoeuvred by
others.
We are influenced here by a body of socio-legal scholarship that has undertaken
and advanced this form of inquiry and analysis.7 We will illustrate our critical

engagement with the concept of moral regulation with reference to the historical
treatment of poor women on welfare (see also Little, 1998). We focus in particular
on the always precarious position of such women within the overarching
(apparently anachronistic) category of the ‘deserving poor’, through the example
of welfare legislation and policy, and the current preoccupation with welfare
fraud. In our view, state provision of social assistance to the poor was neither
principally nor incidentally an expression of benign state coercion or social
control, although distinguished scholars in the field have worked within this
framework (Piven and Cloward, 1971). Our understanding of the regulatory
nature of welfare legislation, and its moral content, has been enhanced by moral
regulation scholars (e.g. Little, 1998). But, as we will illustrate later, moral
regulation offers a partial, perhaps historically specific, analysis of the
operation of welfare law. Recent experience of welfare law reform and
preoccupation with welfare fraud – this redefinition, restructuring, harassment
and disentitlement, coupled with the ever present threat of criminal prosecution –
suggests to us that the state and its coercive apparatus continue to play an
important role, analysis of which is neglected at our peril.
The article is organized in five sections. We begin with a review of some of the
moral regulation literature, devoting particular attention to Canadian
contributions, and outline our conceptualization of the issues related to regulation.
Next, we examine welfare law reform in the 1990s with an emphasis on the
emergence of our specific exemplar of welfare fraud. In the following two
sections, we revisit the concept of moral regulation and consider the (in)ability
of recent forms of moral regulation discourse to explain the current state
preoccupation with welfare fraud. We conclude with some comments on the

utility of a ‘materialist’ concept of moral regulation for feminist theorizing on
socio-legal relations.

A GENEALOGY OF MORAL REGULATION AND ITS
(SOCIO-) LEGAL FORMS

In the last instance (as they say) it is the nature of the state which shapes the
nature of crime control. A quite different theoretical agenda could also be
constructed that does not give the state such a privileged position, that sees the real
force of social control as lying outside the formal punitive system. (Cohen, 1985: 272)

Moral regulation has no agreed-upon meaning. Indeed, as Steve Tombs
(2002) has observed recently in respect of forms of constraint of corporate
behaviour, the ‘disarmingly simple and often used term’ ‘regulation’ covers
myriad forms of actions, processes and actors, such that ‘it is perhaps a less than
useful term’ (p. 113). While we want to hold onto ‘regulation’ as a legal form, we
acknowledge that its pairing with ‘moral’ does not render its meaning any
less opaque. Alan Hunt has similarly noted that the late twentieth-century turn to
moral regulation in sociological and socio-legal literature ‘has not been
accompanied by any close attention to the concept “moral regulation” itself’
(Hunt, 1997: 276; 1999: 7–8).
Nonetheless, one is hard-pressed to find any scholarship in the area that fails
to acknowledge that the elaboration of a contemporary concept of moral
regulation, whatever its theoretical antecedents and progenitors, owes much to the
collaborative work of Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer (1985). In The Great Arch:

English State Formation as Cultural Revolution they presented a close analysis
of the particularity of state formation in England, and specifically, the
‘cultural’ project of English state formation:

. . . moral regulation: a project of normalizing, rendering natural, taken for
granted, in a word ‘obvious’, what are in fact ontological and epistemological
premises of a particular and historical form of social order. Moral regulation is
coextensive with state formation, and state forms are always animated and legitimated
by a particular moral ethos. (p. 4)

This concern with forms of social relations and state action or state formation may
be found as well in their pioneering (if seemingly lesser known) contribution to
Marxist theorizing on the rule of law and ‘specifically legal forms of regulation’
(1981: 30). They argued that ‘moral topography’ is integral to law – ‘a mapping of
the social world which normalises its preferred contours
– and, equally suppresses or at best marginalises other ways of seeing and
being’ (1981: 33). But if this moral topography is integral to law, so too is law
integral to morality:

For law is not merely the passive reflection of the moral and material framework
which overarches it. There is a dialectic to be observed . . .
Law is absolutely central to this regulation . . . It is, in sum, the major means
through which the boundaries of preferred moral classifications can be regulated:
defined, emphasised, focused, nuanced, shifted. (1981: 40)

Some critics have chided Corrigan and Sayer for ‘disabling’ their analysis by their

ongoing commitment to the relevance of the state in moral regulation (Dean,
1994: 145–68; Valverde, 1994: 212). However, as Alan Hunt (1999) points out,
since Corrigan and Sayer’s immediate objective ‘was precisely to provide an
account of state-formation; it seems to be beside the point to criticise such a project
for being state-centred’ (p. 15). It is also clear that their work stands as an
exemplar to those who would erect a narrow or crude version of Marxist
theorizing in order to illustrate its inadequacy.
While Corrigan and Sayer placed the moral regulation project squarely
within state actions and legal relations, one of the promises of less
‘statecentred’ scholars is the way in which moral regulation can render visible the
fact that the state has not held a monopoly on ‘moral’ projects. The state must be
decentred (Valverde, 1991), or its relationship with non-state agencies better
appreciated (Valverde, 1995), or erased as a significant player altogether (Valverde,
1998). For Mariana Valverde (1994), the heart of moral regulation, or moral
reform in a ‘moral capitalist setting . . . is not so much to change behaviour as to
generate certain ethical subjectivities that appear as inherently moral’ (p. 216; see
also Weir, 1986). The focus is less on the (material) consequences of regulation or
reform than on the (discursive) contest. However, the concept of ‘control’ has
not completely vanished, as the new interest in ‘self control’ and ‘self
regulation’ might suggest (Valverde, 1998; Stenson, 1999). One might be
forgiven for continuing to consider the ‘echoes’ of social control when ‘agencies of
moral regulation’ are identified as ‘schools, welfare agencies, charities’ (Valverde,
1994: 215; see also Little, 1998).
But, as others have asked: ‘Why moral?’ (Dean, 1994: 147) (To which we may
be seen to be adding: ‘Why regulation?’) What is meant by ‘moral’ and why is the

concept ‘moral’ employed in preference to ‘social’? It is not a theoretical
imperative, as Lorna Weir’s (1986) early important work has demonstrated.
The answer may derive in part from the distance sought to be established between
an older, cruder, instrumentalist concept of social control and a more finely
tuned, nuanced yet precise and specific concept of moral regulation (Valverde
and Weir, 1988: 31–4; Hunt, 1997; 1999; Strange and Loo, 1997; Little, 1998;
Campbell, 1999). Yet much of the literature seems more able to explain why
regulation is preferred to control, leaving the inference that the meaning of moral
is self-evident.
For Alan Hunt (1997), moral regulation facilitates a richer, more cogent
analysis of social relations than is possible with the

more conventional category ‘social control’ which has the disadvantage of
assuming a unitary and self-conscious project of some primary agent . . . that
imposes itself on others . . . Moral regulation in contrast is more messy; it is never
unitary, its agents vary widely, it never goes uncontested and its selfconsciousness
is complex. (p. 277)

Margaret Little’s (1998) illuminating historical study of the moral regulation of
single mothers in Ontario owes an intellectual debt to moral regulation scholars who
reject the image of regulator as ‘powerful’, in favour of ‘the contestation of different
definitions of morality and the alliances formed’ (p. xix). Little is committed to
appreciating the importance of ‘resistance to change’ as well as the ‘cultural activities
of the state and other social agencies’ (p. xix). However, she suggests that the claims
of moral regulation are modest:

. . . [M]oral regulation provides us with another lens through which to examine the
complexities of welfare policy. This model cannot explain the conditions observed,
but it can help to highlight relationships and regulations that many take for granted.
(p. xix, emphasis in original)

But Dean’s (1994) question still looms: ‘Why moral?’ (p. 147). Ultimately, Dean
rejects the concept – in part because ‘the adjective, moral, remains indeterminate . . .
it delineates no clear domain that is (even relatively) autonomous from forms of
political regulation and state power’ (p. 147) – and he argues that
‘governmentality’ is less problematic and more useful as an analytic construct.
For Hunt (1999), moral regulation is a useful concept, but for ‘analytical purposes
only’ since there is ‘no place where “the moral” rules alone or even predominates’
(p. 8). As he conceptualizes it:

The moral dimension of regulation is not to be found in the intentions of the
regulatory agents on the simple methodological grounds that we can have no sure
access to intention, and no means of distinguishing motive from selfjustification.
Rather, my definition of moral regulation is a process in which moral discourses,
techniques and practices make up the primary field of contestation. (Hunt, 1997: 279)

We are mindful that for some scholars who have helped to develop moral
regulation as an analytic frame, its appeal lies in the focus on non-state actors and
processes it is seen to facilitate. Thus, the state is decentred from a ubiquitous ‘pride
of place’ position in shaping and containing ‘civil society’.8 While sympathetic to
this ‘decentring’ emphasis, we want to argue for a renewed focus on social and
state forces, and in particular the contradictions and contributions of forms of
law and state to gendered and anti-racist class struggles in the realm of moral

regulation. In other words, moral regulation must be situated expressly within the
context of capitalist class relations and struggles; not least of which, in the current
context, is capital’s (globalized) attack on the ‘straw house’ of the Keynesian
welfare state. We want to reinsert and re-articulate the relationship between legal
regulation and moral regulation without collapsing them into each other or the
state, or rendering one or other invisible.
Our concern is that despite the richness, depth, and diversity of the
scholarship reviewed earlier, the concept of moral regulation that emerges from
it does not deliver the contestation, the messiness, the resistance that it promises.
In our view, it continues to be important to attend to the different forms of
regulation, the different sites, forms and levels of state and social policy and
law. To illustrate our position, we draw on Stuart Hall’s early work on law,
state, and moral regulation; specifically, his analysis of the reformist 1960s’ era
of the ‘legislation of consent’ in Britain when laws relating to divorce,
homosexuality, abortion, prostitution were liberalized (Hall, 1980). Hall’s
organizing question is (p. 2): ‘What was it about the shifts in the modality of moral
regulation which enabled this legislation, plausibly,

to be described as

“permissive”?’
Hall reminds us that in ‘the ‘legislation of consent’ no single uncontradictory
tendency is to be discovered’ (p. 7). By way of illustration, Hall argues that the
highly influential Report of the Wolfenden Committee on prostitution and
homosexuality ‘identified and separated more sharply two areas of legal and
moral practice – those of sin and crime, of immorality and illegality’ (p. 11). In so
doing, Wolfenden created ‘a firmer opposition between these two domains’ and
‘clearly staked out a new relation between the two modes of moral regulation –

the modalities of legal compulsion and of selfregulation’ (p. 11–12, emphasis
added). Wolfenden recommended decriminalization and ‘privatisation of
selective aspects of sexual conduct’ (p. 13, emphasis in original). Hall identifies
the ‘double taxonomy’ of the Wolfenden recommendations: Towards stricter
penalty and control, towards greater freedom and leniency (p. 14). Here then
was the core of the tendency of the 1960s’ permissive legislation: ‘Increased
regulation coupled with selective privatisation through contract or consent, both
in a new disposition’ (p. 21, emphasis added), a ‘more privatised and personfocused regulation, tacit rather than explicit, invisible rather than visible’ (p. 21).
For us, Hall’s questions, method of analysis, and insights continue to be
cogent. In identifying the ‘double taxonomy’ of control and penalty and
freedom and leniency, or simultaneous deregulation and increased regulation, Hall
reminds us of the complexity of the unity of the 1960s’ reforms. The state was pulled
back and re-inserted in different ways in the same pieces of legislation; its
invisibility in one area was reinforced by its visibility in the other. From our
perspective, his insight that ‘self-regulation’ was inextricably related to increased
‘public’ regulation is important. The lines between unacceptable public and
permissible private conduct were ever more sharply drawn. In this way, two
modalities of moral regulation, legal compulsion and self-regulation, one neither
displacing nor transcending the other, co-existed in a complex unity. Before applying
this conceptualization of moral regulation to our exemplar of welfare fraud,
we would first like to provide an overview of the always unstable terrain of
Canadian welfare law and policy in the twilight years of the twentieth century, a
period marked by the teeter tottering of the welfare state. In the next section we
look at welfare law reform during the 1990s in order to consider the heightened

interest, indeed legal shifts, in the area of welfare fraud in Canada.

WELFARE REFORM IN THE 1990S

The new zero tolerance policy is the first of its kind in Canada, and a key step in
Ontario’s welfare reforms.9

Although governments of all political stripes (re)formed welfare policy and
legislation during the 1990s (Moscovitch, 1997; Bashevkin, 2002), we use
Ontario as our primary exemplar. Taking its cue from the Klein administration
in Alberta (see Denis, 1995; Kline, 1997), the Harris government arguably was
the most draconian among the Canadian provinces in effecting changes.10 Welfare,
and in particular a vow to ‘crackdown’ on welfare ‘fraud’, were the centrepiece of
the Ontario government’s welfare policy (Ontario, 1999; 2000a). Indeed, one of
the first things the Harris Tories did upon election in 1995 was to introduce a
22 percent cut to welfare rates and to redefine (i.e. broaden) the definition of
spouse in welfare law in order to disentitle a broader range of previously
entitled recipients (see Gavigan, 1999). Although all of Canada’s welfare poor
live on incomes that are thousands of dollars below the poverty line (National
Council of Welfare, 2002; 2003), in post-1995 Tory Ontario, the welfare rate
cut ensured that the ‘poverty gap’ widened even further (McMullin, Davies
and Cassidy, 2002; National Council of Welfare, 2003: 66, f. 5. 2). The household
income of a single employable recipient of social assistance in Ontario fell to 35
percent of the federal government’s low income cut-off measure; the income of

a single parent with one child dropped to 58 percent of the poverty line
(Gavigan, 1999: 212–13; National Council of Welfare, 2003: 28, t. 2. 1). An
Ontario couple with two children on welfare had an income ($18,400) that is 20
percent of the estimated average income of a four-person family in Ontario
($90,606) (National Council of Welfare, 2003: 31, t. 3.1).
The discourse and politics of welfare fraud have obscured the imprecision of
what is considered to be fraud, and by whom. In Harris Tory discourse, it came
to

encompass

all

forms

of

overpayments,

whether

resulting

from

administrative errors or not, including people in jail whose welfare should have
been terminated upon incarceration, as well as formal fraud convictions –
numerically insignificant as these continue to be. Indeed, the government’s own
‘Welfare Fraud Control Reports’ tend to collapse categories, frequently failing to
distinguish between benefit ‘reduction’ and ‘termination’, and the reasons
therefore (Ontario, 2003). As the coroner who presided at the Kimberly
Rogers’s Inquest observed of the evidence that had been presented during the two
months of hearings: ‘Overpayments . . . may occur for a number of reasons,
most of which are related to administrative items and the settlement of
supplementary income received in previous periods; while overpayments are
common, overpayments due to fraud are very uncommon’ (Eden, 2003).
Crackdowns on welfare abuse during the 1970s and early 1980s (see
Golding and Middleton, 1982; Rachert, 1990) were followed by the overhaul of
welfare policies in most liberal democracies. In Ontario in 1988, the Social
Assistance Review Committee (SARC) released Transitions, a 600-page
report with 274 recommendations on Ontario’s social assistance system
(Ontario, 1988). The issues of ‘system integrity’ and ‘welfare fraud’ were dealt

with in seven pages, and yielded but two recommendations (p. 380). These
recommendations were motivated not because the Committee was convinced
that the system was being ‘bled’ by fraud, but in order to address and instil public
confidence in the system (pp. 384–6):

We have no evidence to suggest that fraud in the social assistance system is
greater than it is in the tax system or the unemployment insurance system.
Nevertheless, because public confidence in the social assistance system depends in
large part on the belief that the funds are being well spent and that abuse is being
kept to a minimum, we accept that some of the measures adopted to control
social assistance fraud may need to be more extensive that they are in other
systems. (p. 384)

Significantly, however, the Report identified adequacy of benefits as the ‘single
most important weapon in the fight against fraud in the system’ (p. 384, emphasis
added).
In a comprehensive response to the recommendations concerning ‘system
integrity’, Dianne Martin (1992) criticized the Committee for abandoning its own
guiding principles, in particular its commitment to the creation of a welfare
regime based on dignity and autonomy of social assistance recipients. Noting the
dearth of reliable data on the incidence of welfare fraud in Ontario, Martin
suggested that the most reliable indicator (conviction rate) placed the incidence
rate at less than 1 percent (p. 93). The disproportional criminalization and
punitive treatment of women on welfare figured prominently among Martin’s
concerns, and even when judges appeared to be sympathetic, women were
convicted and incarcerated (p. 91). The guiding sentencing principles, as Martin

noted (p. 66), stressed deterrence as ‘the paramount consideration’ even where
the case was ‘pitiful’ (see also R. v Thurrott (1971); Wilkie, 1993; Carruthers,
1995).
The complexity of the rules and the reporting requirements facing welfare
recipients has not diminished over the 15 years since the Transitions Report was
released. On the contrary, as Ian Morrison (1995) has illustrated, the rules and
reporting requirements have become more difficult and intrusive. As noted
earlier, the previous legislation permitted a welfare recipient to receive social
assistance as well as an income-based student loan in order to attend college or
university. No longer. Now she runs the risk of a welfare fraud conviction
(McKinnon and Lacey, 2001; Keck, 2002).
From a modest, almost insignificant, place in Transitions, the fight against
welfare fraud emerged as a centrepiece of provincial welfare policy in
Ontario, irrespective of governing political party (Moscovitch, 1997; Morrison,
1995; Little, 1998: 139–63). Far from being a minor residual concern
triggered by a few ‘cheats’ (McKeever, 1999: 261–70), policies of ‘Enhanced
Verification’ and the introduction of ‘snitch lines’, ‘zero tolerance,’ and
‘permanent ineligibility’ all illustrate the shift that has occurred. More intense
measures were developed to ensure that a recipient is eligible, and the creation of
the ‘snitch hotline’ was designed to encourage the anonymous reporting of
suspected fraud and abuse by neighbours. Again, despite the modest results
(Morrison and Pearce, 1995; Little, 1998; Ontario, 1999; 2000a; 2003; Rogers v
Sudbury (2001)), the government celebrated this form of ‘deputization’ of its
citizenry to inform on friends, neighbours and acquaintances. Far from
instilling ‘public confidence’ in the social security system (Ontario, 1988), these

initiatives ensured that a lack of public confidence is maintained and encouraged,
whilst now conveying the impression that fraud was rampant, and that every
person on welfare needed to be watched and reported and tested.
It is important to note as well that unlike the situation in Britain (McKeever,
1999: 261–70), this shift in the direction of increased surveillance and
criminalization of welfare recipients, notably women on welfare, illustrates that
the (coercive form of) criminal law and (the regulatory form of) welfare law are
inseparable. The Criminal Code continues to be used to prosecute welfare recipients
where fraud is suspected, and even ‘sincere, devoted mothers’ like Donna Bond
find themselves at risk of prosecution and conviction. For all the heightened
intensity and investigation of welfare fraud, however, the convictions boasted
by the Ontario government – 1123 in 1997–8, 747 in 1998–9, and 547 in 1999–
2000 – amounted to no more than 1.36 percent of the total number of welfare
recipients in the province based on Ontario welfare statistics (Ontario, 1999;
2000a, b); and less than 1 percent based on National Council of Welfare Statistics
(2000).11

WOMEN, WELFARE AND FRAUD: THE ‘NEVER DESERVING’ POOR

In using welfare law and, in particular, welfare fraud to interrogate the
efficacy of (moral) regulation, it is important to be clear about what we are and
are not saying. While we share the view that law is central (Corrigan and Sayer,
1981: 40), we are not asserting that the law is necessarily determinative of the
nature of the relations that it defines, governs or regulates (Gavigan, 1986:
279–312). Nor are we denying the relevance of informal and non-legal practices,

and indeed non-state practices (assuming they can be identified). We are
arguing against the ‘expulsion of law’ (Hunt, 1993) and the erasure of the state.
Indeed, it is ironic that just as the regulatory state has been identified by the right
as a problem because of its ‘pervasive’ and intrusive presence in everyday life and
business transactions, the state has similarly been rolled back in the critical
socio-legal scholarship we discussed earlier. We concur with those who continue
to argue for the interconnectedness of the material, social and cultural and the
need to look at redistribution as well as identity/self-formation (Collins, 1991;
Fraser, 1997; Roberts, 1997; Boyd, 1999; Brenner, 2000; Razack, 2002).
We are influenced as well by Alan Hunt’s (1993) ‘relational theory of law’
which ‘does not artificially separate legal from other forms of social relations’ (p.
225) and his important insight:

. . . relational theory facilitates the recognition and exploration of the degree and
forms in which legal relations penetrate other forms of social relations . . . It also
embraces the idea that the ‘presence of law’ within social relations is not just to be
gauged by institutional intervention but also by the presence of legal concepts and
ideas within types of social relations that appear to be free of law. (p. 225)

Of particular relevance for our purposes is Hunt’s comment on the pervasive
theme in governmentality literature that sites of power are dispersed:
In reorienting the focus of attention toward the plurality of power, and to the
significance of local and capillary power there is an unwelcome, but avoidable
tendency to expel the state. Without derogating from or evading the significance of the
plurality of power it is essential to ‘bring the state back in’. (pp. 312–13)

We are concerned that the neglect of law and state as social relations in some of
the moral regulation scholarship reinforces the ‘artificial separation’ of legal
relations from other social relations and thus risks rendering invisible what
Richard Kinsey (1979) once characterized as the ‘despotism of legality’. In
theorizing welfare fraud, it seems clear that there have been important shifts in
welfare policy which seem not to be captured by ‘moral regulation’ in its
Foucauldian form. We want to argue that a significant ideological shift (evident in
welfare-related practices) has occurred, and that it is impossible to de-centre the
state and the heightened attention to welfare fraud during the 1990s.
In this discussion, we are not suggesting that the welfare reforms of the 1990s
marked a complete departure from past practices. We see important historical
continuities in welfare legislation and policy that need to be emphasized
(Abramovitz, 1996; Little, 1998; Mosher, 2000). First, welfare policy has always
been premised on the separation of the ‘deserving’ from the ‘undeserving’ poor.
Second, the social support accorded to the deserving was, and continues to be,
based on ‘the principle of less eligibility’ or the assumption that welfare
recipients should not receive more money than the worst paid worker in the
labour force. Third, the ‘deserving’ always have been at risk of falling into the
ranks of the ‘undeserving’; as Little (1998) well demonstrates, single mothers on
social assistance have been and are subjected to intrusive and ‘moral’ surveillance
of their homes, their cleanliness, their childrearing abilities, their personal lives,
and so on (see also Buchanan, 1995: 33, 40). Fourth, criminal prosecutions for
welfare fraud have always occurred (Rachert, 1990; Martin, 1992: 52–97; Evans
and Swift, 2000).
What then made the 1990s different from earlier times? We see an important

ideological shift from welfare liberalism to neo-liberalism (see also Stenson,
1999). However, our analysis leads us to conclude that the shift is one in which a
major state presence and resources are still required. On the one hand, the state
is ideologically de-centred but no less present (Denis, 1995). The form of the
state and its social policy has shifted; social programmes designed to ameliorate
or redistribute have been eroded, laying bare a heightened state presence which
condemns and punishes the poor. On the other hand, the effect of this ideological
shift has been a huge expansion in the category of undeserving poor. Indeed,
virtually no one is considered ‘deserving’; even those who do receive social
assistance are viewed as temporary recipients who must demonstrate their
willingness to work for welfare and who ultimately will be employed as a result
of skills and experience gained through workfare and other government-subsidised
programmes. Thus, sole-parent mothers who historically were more likely to be
deemed

‘deserving’ than were childless men and women are no longer so ‘privileged’
(Buchanan, 1995; Moscovitch, 1997; Little, 1998; Mortenson, 1999; Mosher,
2000; Swift and Birmingham, 2000; Bashevkin, 2002).

This redefinition of the ‘undeserving poor’ has required a massive
redeployment but, arguably, not a reduction in the allocation of state resources to
welfare. The downsizing of social assistance payments is accompanied by a
concomitant

increase

in

state-subsidised

make-work

and

workfare

programmes that ostensibly will (re)turn participants to the labour force, and a
dramatic increase in the state-implemented technologies and programmes which

are aimed at ferreting out and punishing the ‘undeserving’ poor (Mortenson,
1999; Mosher, 2000; Swift and Birmingham, 2000). Indeed, the lifetime ban upon
conviction for welfare fraud arguably ensures a lifetime of (secondary)
punishment (without parole) and unameliorated poverty following upon such a
conviction.
In sum, we want to emphasize that there are important differences between the
past and the current context in which welfare and welfare fraud are being framed.
We are witnessing a profound attack on the ‘social’, indeed the erosion of
social responsibility, and in this attack, the authoritarian, neoliberal state is an
important player. As we illustrate in the next section, despite the apparent
transcendence of social relations and state forms (in favour of dispersed
pluralities of power) – where, as Alan Hunt has argued (1997), the ‘social’ is
replaced by the moral and the moral is a realm unto itself – moral regulation,
whether in its emergence or its repudiation, must be understood in relation to
state and social policy.

MORAL REGULATION RECAST

It is imperative to recognize that the increased emphasis on welfare and
welfare fraud has occurred in the context of state (re)formation in liberal
democracies. We concur with (moral regulation) scholars who argue that the
success of the ‘new right’ in Ontario and elsewhere cannot be reduced to
economics and globalization. Rather, restructuring and the decline of ‘the
social’ must ‘be understood in the context of a vast cultural offensive to transform

society’ in which ‘the ability to wield state power is essential . . .’ (Denis, 1995: 373;
see also Hall, 1988). As Denis (1995) argues: ‘Far from losing its sovereignty, the
state reasserts its power over the lives of citizens . . . It turns itself into the
“authoritarian state,” one of whose main characteristics is to usher in a new,
more intense regime of moral regulation . . .’ (p. 373).
In concluding our discussion of welfare fraud we want to return to Hall’s (1980)
argument that the ‘legislation of consent’ was shot through with contradictory
tendencies making the ‘unity’ of the various statutes involved ‘a necessarily
complex one’ (p. 7). We can identify contradictory tendencies related to welfare
reform in Ontario and elsewhere during the 1980s and 1990s that restructured
the relation between the two modes of moral regulation – self-regulation and
compulsion. Specifically, we can identify a ‘double taxonomy’ (p. 14) in the
welfare reforms towards both expanded privatization and increased regulation.
On the one hand, we see the intensified individualization of poverty through the
emphasis on personal responsibility, the imposition of self-reliance and the
relegation of former welfare recipients to the market (see also Cossman, 2002).
The slight and grudging acknowledgement of social responsibility for the poor
that marked the Keynesian state has been rescinded. Now, as in the
nineteenth century, poverty is a problem of individuals in civil society and the
solution to poverty is an individualized one to be found principally in the labour
market and/or marriage.12
This intensified individualization of poverty has major implications for loneparent women. Historically, the ‘deserving’ mother on welfare may have been
‘hapless’ (Evans and Swift, 2000) and ‘pitied, but not entitled’ (Gordon, 1994),
but she also was a public servant of sorts so long as she was considered to be

(morally) fit. During the 1990s, Ontario and other governments began divesting
themselves of public servants, including ‘welfare moms’, and placed the
emphasis on creating choices to work and become self-sufficient. Now, work is
strictly confined to the (private) market and mother work no longer receives
even the tacit recognition that it was accorded by Keynesian states. The
promotion of individual responsibility and self-reliance together with the
equation of work with paid, private-sector employment is very clear in the
statement of key principles underpinning Ontario’s (re)formed welfare system:
‘Doing nothing on welfare is no longer an option . . . Participation [in Ontario
Works] is mandatory for all ablebodied people, including sole-support parents
with school-aged children’ (Ontario, 2000b: 1; see also Lalonde, 1997).
Defining work as paid employment means that women who do unpaid work
can no longer be dependent on the state, but they can work for welfare or be
dependent on an individually responsible, self-reliant, employed spouse or same
sex partner. The Harris government underscored this point by refining and
expanding the ‘spouse in the house’ rule on the ground that ‘no one deserves
higher benefits just because they are not married’.13 Thus, while ‘welfare
dependency’ has become a form of personality disorder signifying inadequacy
and ‘diagnosed more frequently in females’ (Fraser and Gordon, 1994: 326), the
‘approved’ alternative, or perhaps supplement, to the market for sole-parent
women is marriage and the family (Murray, 1990). As Segal (1999) points out:
‘This is why single mothers can be demonized if they don’t work, even while
married women with young children can be demonized if they do’ (p. 206,
emphasis in original).
On the other hand, concomitant with the emphasis on the intensified

individualization of poverty is the intensified state regulation and surveillance of
dwindling numbers of public welfare recipients, now re-defined as individuals
who need ‘temporary financial assistance . . . while they satisfy obligations to
becoming and staying employed’ (Ontario Works Act, 1997, s. 2). Since welfare ‘is
temporary, not permanent’ (s. 2), the state must ensure that public money is not
being wasted on ‘fraudsters’. The Ontario legislation invokes the neo-liberal
language

of

self-reliance

through

employment,

temporary

financial

assistance, efficient delivery and accountability to taxpayers.14 However, as
noted earlier, Ontario poured extensive resources into the establishment of an
elaborate and constantly expanding system of surveillance aimed at detecting and
preventing fraud and misuse of the social assistance system. At the same time as
massive cuts to welfare rates were implemented, the government allocated
considerable money for special staff with expanded powers to investigate
welfare fraud: There were 300 such investigators in 1998–9 and the
government was providing ‘additional funding for up to 100 more staff to do this
work’ (Ontario, 2000b). Additional government resources were used to create
and maintain the Welfare Fraud Hotline and a province-wide Welfare Fraud
Control Database, and to prosecute alleged ‘fraudsters’. Clearly, the state is not
reluctant to spend public money if the funding is spent on policing welfare
recipients as opposed to providing for them.
Of course, if we move beyond what government authorities themselves say, it
becomes clear that the moralization and criminalization of the poor in general
and ‘welfare moms’ in particular are far from being a seamless process.
Contradictions are evident both among those who apply welfare law and policy
and among those who are the targets of moralization. Judicial decision-making,

for instance, is not all of a piece in cases involving mothers charged with welfare
fraud. Some of the criminal cases where women were convicted of welfare fraud
for ‘spouse in the house’ and hence not living as a single person, do illustrate
the neo-liberal ideological shift from bad mothers to bad choices (R. v Sim
(1980); R. v Jantunen [1994]; R. v Slaght [1995]; R. v Plemel [1995]). But not every
woman charged with welfare fraud is convicted, or if convicted, sent to jail. Some
judges go to lengths to ensure this. Donna Bond received a conditional discharge,
50 hours of community service and six months probation.15 In another
Ontario case, Trainor J. refused to convict a battered woman for welfare fraud
(R. v Lalonde (1995); see also Carruthers, 1995). Moreover, in Lalonde, the welfare
authorities had acquiesced to the man’s presence in the home and only charged her
when the man ‘self-reported’ his presence. Finally, following an inquest into the
house arrest death of Kimberly Rogers, a coroner’s jury in Sudbury made a
number of recommendations, including that the zero tolerance lifetime
ineligibility be eliminated and that the provincial government should assess the
adequacy of welfare rates.16
Accounts of ‘welfare mothers’ also reveal diversity in practices among
financial aid and frontline workers (Mortenson, 1999). Some workers are
empathetic and supportive; others are punitive and controlling of their
‘clients’. Likewise, the poor, including ‘welfare mothers’, are far from constituting
a homogeneous category (Gavigan, 1999: 213–18; Swift and Birmingham, 2000).
While welfare recipients arguably have a common class position, the ways in
which they acquire that class position are diverse and mediated by other social
relations of gender, race, sexual orientation, and (dis)ability, that in turn,
influence the ways and extent to which mothers on welfare, for instance, are

active agents in shaping these relations. Many women live in constant fear of the
scrutiny that may result in the loss of welfare assistance for not reporting income,
having partners stay overnight, or being reported for child abuse and losing their
children (Mortenson, 1999: 122–3; Falkiner v Ontario (2002): 515, paras 103, 104).
As a result, they engage in continual ‘self-censorship’ of their activities (Little,
1998: 180). Others resist or challenge current welfare law and policy through the
establishment and participation in informal support networks of ‘welfare moms’
and/or anti-poverty agencies and organizations (Buchanan, 1995; Little, 1998;
Mortenson, 1999). Interview studies also reveal ideological contradictions
among ‘welfare mothers’. A few espouse the social Darwinism of neo-liberal law
and policy. They see themselves as short-term, ‘deserving’ welfare recipients
who through workfare programmes and/or their own hard work will become
‘contributing’ members of society again (Mortenson, 1999). Some also feel
resentful of and more ‘deserving’ than other mothers on welfare whom they feel
are ‘faring better in the distribution of scarce resources, including jobs’ (Swift
and Birmingham, 2000: 94–5). In contrast, others strongly reject the neo-liberal
thrust of current welfare legislation and policy, equating workfare programmes and
the rationales for them as government propaganda:
. . . I went to one of these . . . workfare programs, and it was unbelievably stupid
. . . You have to be gung ho about making nothing and not getting any benefits or
security, is basically what they’re telling you in so many words. And then they’re
doing all these self-esteem boosting exercises with you, so that you’re just really
gung ho about fucking working for nothing. It’s ridiculous . . . The pay is $5 a day
and you have to work 40 hours a week for $5 a day . . . It’s a cheap labour strategy.
. . . (Mortenson, 1999: 66, emphasis in original)

Although the scope of this article precludes detailed discussion, we want to
emphasize that the regulation/deregulation contradiction in the area of
welfare legislation and policy reforms aimed at the poor also should be viewed in the
context of government actions related to the welfare of the affluent and the
regulation of capital. Increased criminalization and punishment of welfare fraud
have occurred simultaneously with the deregulation and ‘disappearance of
corporate crime’ (Snider, 1999; see also Pearce and Tombs, 1998: 567–75;
Glasbeek, 2002; Tombs, 2002). Massive welfare cuts targeting poor people are
implemented at the same time as huge corporate tax cuts which, together with
direct fiscal subsidies, arguably are forms of social welfare for the rich (Young, 2000;
Abramovitz, 2001). The deregulation and de facto decriminalization of corporate
wrongdoing benefit a minority of (primarily) affluent white men while the
criminalization of poverty and the intensified prosecution of welfare fraud punish
the poor disproportionately (see Beckett and Western, 2001).
And, although state law has never been used effectively against corporate
crime, we agree with Snider (1999) that the disappearance of corporate crime
matters:
. . . abandoning state sanctions has far-reaching symbolic and practical
consequences. State laws are public statements that convey important public messages
about the obligations of the employer classes . . . The situation is paradoxical
indeed: while crimes of the powerful were never effectively sanctioned by state law,
such laws are nonetheless essential to the operation of democratic societies. (p. 205)

The concomitant deregulation of corporate crime and increased punitiveness
toward welfare fraud (and ‘street crime’ more generally), suggest that in an

authoritarian form of liberal democratic state, government interventionism is redirected, not eliminated (Hall, 1988; Denis, 1995: 368). State withdrawal from
Keynesian social programmes and the economy occurs in tandem with
government activism around issues such as capital punishment and youth crime
(Denis, 1995: 369; Hermer and Mosher, 2002). In our conclusion, we consider
the implications of this shift in the focus of state interventionism for the
regulation of mothers on welfare.

CONCLUSION

In our view, there are some clear historical continuities (as well as differences)
between social control and moral regulation as analytic constructs that
warrant further study. As we argued earlier, moral regulation became an
influential concept in non-Marxist analyses of power, regulation and control in the
context of the neo-liberal state of the late twentieth century when the apparent
triumph of privatization, globalization, and unfettered (indeed unregulated)
transnational capital seemed to symbolize the decline of ‘the social’ and the
nation-state itself. The more recent literature on moral regulation tends to focus
primarily on ‘self-control’ and ‘self-formation’ which are thereby divorced from
‘a contemplation of the state’ (Cohen, 1985: 5) and from a consideration of the
political and economic issues of redistribution (Fraser, 1997; Segal, 1999). In
some contemporary moral regulation scholarship, ‘poverty’ is a discursive
construct which displaces the class analysis that characterized the Marxianinformed (historical), socio-legal literature from the 1970s and early 1980s (Hay et
al., 1975; Thompson, 1977; Hall et al., 1978; Fine et al., 1979; Corrigan and Sayer,

1981; Fine, 1984).
In the contemporary context, much moral regulation literature has argued for a
position that ‘privileges’ non-state sites; a position which is seen to offer an
antidote to both ‘right-wing’, neo-liberal theory and an ‘economistic’, statefocussed

neo-Marxist

perspective.

Frequently,

however,

the

latter

is

represented as a crude version of instrumentalist neo-Marxism that arguably owes
more to the ‘repressive’ concept of social control than to Marx. As Garland
(1997) puts it: ‘. . . that brand of Marxist theory was always decidedly
unsociological, and it can hardly be said to exhaust the analytical range of
sociological work’ (p. 205). Contemporary ‘post-Marxist’ scholars have
aimed to follow another analytical path. Their writings echo Foucault on the
dispersed nature of power and the productive versus repressive aspects of
control/regulation. Yet, like their social control predecessors, they often end up
looking at controllers/regulators, frequently in ‘non-state’ sites. On this point, we
again find one of Garland’s (1997) comments on the governmentality literature to
be equally applicable to some of the writing on moral regulation:
It is precisely because the authorities’ analysis can be incorrect . . . that one wants
to generate alternative accounts. Moreover, these alternative analytical accounts are
crucial if one wants to explain not just the nature of programmes but also the impact
that they have in the fields that they govern. (p. 201)

Can a ‘materialist’ concept of moral regulation have any utility for feminist
theorizing? In our view, the concept has analytic utility as long as we
continue to attend to the location of moral regulation in social policy and forms
of law and state, and maintain an emphasis on the contradictions, social

antagonisms and class relations in a given social formation. The hard lives of poor
women and their children impel us to resist any form of analysis that is also not
attentive to the jagged edges of coercive laws that condemn them to the new ranks
of the never deserving poor.
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1.

General Welfare Assistance Act, R. S. O. 1990, c. G.6, as rep. by Social Assistance
Reform Act, 1997, S. O. 1997, c. 25 enacting Ontario Works Act, 1997, S.
O. 1997, c. 25, s. 1 and Ontario Disability Support Program Act, 1997, S. O. c. 25, s. 2.
The purpose of the Ontario Works legislation is to establish a programme that, as
expressed in s. 1:
(a) Recognizes individual responsibility and promotes self reliance through
employment;
(b) Provides temporary financial assistance to those most in need while they satisfy
obligations to become and stay employed;
(c) Effectively serves people needing assistance; and
(d) Is accountable to the taxpayers of Ontario.
Ontario Works Act, 1997, O. Reg. 134/98 (amended to O. Reg. 197/02), Reg. 29
(1.5) and (1.6).
Ontario Works Act, 1997, O. Reg. 134/98, Reg. 33.
See Hermer and Mosher (2002) for commentary on Ontario’s Safe Streets Act, 1999,
S. O. 1999, c. 8. This legislation (more aptly, the Mean Streets Act) renders illegal the
street activity of ‘squeegee kids’ and panhandlers.
Ontario Works Act, 1997, O. Reg. 134/98, Reg. 9 (a) and (b), provide that no single
person who is in full-time attendance at a post-secondary educational institution is
eligible for assistance if the person is in receipt of a student loan or is ineligible for a
student loan because of parental income.

2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

7.
8.
9.
10.

On 2 October 2003, the Ontario Tories were defeated by the Liberal Party in the
provincial election. On 17 December 2003, the Hon. Sandra Pupatello, the new
Minister of Community and Social Services, characterized the Tory
government as having treated people on welfare as ‘a typical punching bag’ and she
expressed the new government’s commitment to a ‘series of reforms’ so that ‘the
system actually works for people’ including an increase in welfare rates. The
Minister also acknowledged the Government’s obligation to respond to the
recommendations of the Kimberly Rogers Inquest recommendations (Ontario,
Legislative Assembly of Ontario, First Session, 38th Parliament, Official
Debates (Hansard) No. 17A Wednesday 17 December 2003 at 868). On 9
January 2004, the Minister announced that the government would repeal the
lifetime ban for those convicted of welfare fraud. However, the Minister also
restated the Government’s commitment to ‘no tolerance’ for welfare fraud. The
permanent ineligibility sections of the Regulations were repealed by O. Reg.
456/03 made under the Ontario Works Act 1997. See also, Galloway (2004: A9). In our
view, as significant as the repeal of the lifetime ban is, it is equally important to note
that Kimberly Rogers would still find herself liable to a conviction for welfare fraud,
and if serving a sentence of house arrest, the amount of social assistance would still
leave her only $18 a month to live on after her rent was paid. It needs to be recalled
that when she died whilst serving her sentence of house arrest, Ms Rogers’s welfare
benefits had been reinstated by court order; it simply was not enough for her to live
on, and the conditions of house arrest limited her access to other resources and
sources of support.
For a political economy approach to these issues, see Fudge and Cossman (2002).
See, however, Glasbeek (1998; 2003) whose study of the Toronto Women’s Court is
attentive both to the question of moral regulation and to the role of and
relationship between the state and social actors.
Ontario Progressive Conservative government policy statement, 18 January 2000.
See Masse v Ontario [1996]; Rogers v Sudbury (2001); Broomer v Ontario

[2002]. The more recent initiatives of the Campbell provincial government in
British Columbia challenge and may surpass the dubious record of the Harris
Tories, see ‘B. C. Throne Speech outlines massive change’ (Matas, 2002: A 15).
11. For instance, the most recent figures available from the provincial Ministry of
Community, Family and Children’s Services, indicate that criminal convictions for
welfare fraud have been in steady decline since 1997–8, falling to 393 convictions in
2001–2 (Ontario, 2003: t. 1).
With respect to the zero tolerance lifetime ban introduced on 1 April 2000, The
Income Security Advocacy Centre reported that a total of 106 individuals were
permanently ineligible to receive financial assistance due to welfare fraud for offences
committed between 1 April 2000 and 27 November 2002.
12. This is illustrated no less clearly than by the repeal of the General Welfare Act in
Ontario, and the introduction in its place of Ontario Works legislation. General
Welfare Assistance Act, R. S. O. 1990, c. G.6, as rep. by Social Assistance Reform
Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 25 enacting Ontario Works Act, 1997, S.
O. 1997, c. 25, s. 1 [OWA] and Ontario Disability Support Program Act, 1997,
S. O. c. 25, s. 2 [ODSPA].
13. The Ontario Court of Appeal struck down this expanded definition of spouse for
‘its differential treatment of sole support mothers on the combined grounds
of sex, marital status and receipt of social assistance, which discriminates against
them contrary to s. 15 of the Charter’ (Falkiner v Ontario (2002): 515 para. 105). It is
significant to note one is deemed to be a spouse after three months’ cohabitation;
this is a much shorter time period of cohabitation (approximately 2 years and 9
months shorter) than is required under Ontario’s provincial family law legislation
before spousal support obligations and entitlements are triggered.
14. See Ontario Works Act, 1997, s. 1 (a), (b), (c) and (d).
15. Sentencing took place on 19 September 1994. R. v Bond [1994], certificate of
conviction (on file with the authors).
16. Recommendations 1 and 4 of the ‘Verdict of Coroner’s Jury into the Death of
Kimberly Ann Rogers,’ released on 19 December 2002. The Coroner’s Inquest, which
lasted two months, involved eight parties with Standing, all represented by counsel.
The Jury heard from 41 witnesses, and returned its Verdict and
Recommendations on 19 December 2002. The Jury heard that of the 5000 or so
welfare recipients in Kimberly Rogers’s home community of Sudbury, there were at
most one or two convictions for welfare fraud annually. Evidence before the
jury showed that ‘the Crown and the Courts were unaware that upon conviction
the accused would be subject to a suspension of benefits’. Recommendation 14
called for ongoing professional training of criminal justice personnel in this regard.
The 14 recommendations form part of a letter dated 17 January 2003 sent by the
presiding Coroner, Dr. David S. Eden to the Chief Coroner of Ontario (on file with
the authors).
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